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Abstract
This paper proposes a “Cultural Constructivist” approach as a theoretical 
framework to capture how China’s perceived identity of its significant Other is 
constituted and evolves through social interactions, and how such identity in 
turn gives meaning to the PRC’s interactions with another state. Upon building a 
theoretical framework, it will first begin with a literature review and critique on 
Strategic Culture and Constructivism. It then argues that while both cultural factors 
and social interactions are important in foreign relations, the two IR streams failed 
to truly integrate the social and the cultural. The Cultural Constructivist approach 
is a theoretical framework that synthesizes the two to better understand the role 
of culture in social interactions among states. Using China as a referent point for 
analysis, the paper argues that China perceives its significant Other Japan through 
a culturally unique relationship widely known in the disciplines of anthropology, 
sociology and cross-cultural psychology as guanxi. 
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Introduction
Rational choice theorists in IR have long premised their research on “rational 
political behavior.”1 To Realists, all states share a common national interest 
to meet their security requirements.2 Yet, how an individual reacts to a certain 
stimulus depends not on that person’s physical environment but on his subjective 
1 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 
9-10.
2 Hans Morgenthau. In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1951); 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
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understanding of the stimulus. Such understandings are shaped within each of 
our respective cultural setting. Perception is a subjective knowledge and it cannot 
be independent of cultural context3; recent research in cognitive psychology has 
revealed that Westerners and East Asians perceive the world differently.4 Thus, 
rationality is not a universal and intrinsic human nature, but acquired in each of 
our cultural settings. 
This paper uses China’s relationship with Japan as a referent point to argue 
that culture is an important factor in understanding state’s perception of its 
significant Other, based on which foreign policy is formulated. Beginning with a 
brief literature review of culture’s role in IR with a focus on Strategic Culture and 
Constructivism, the paper will then integrate the two IR streams to construct a 
new falsifiable analytical framework used in the following section to describe and 
explain four research questions: (1) Under what conditions and how do Chinese 
cultural behavior patterns appear in the PRC’s Japan policy? (2) How did Japan 
interpret these behaviors, and were there any misunderstandings due to cultural 
differences? (3) How did China interpret Japan’s (re)actions? How is Japan’s 
identity constructed? and (4) How did Japan’s identity influence China’s Japan 
policy?
1. Literature Review
(1) Strategic Culture
The mainstream IR theories have come under criticism of Strategic Culture, which 
later developed into three different generations. The first generation initially 
attempted to explain why different security communities approached strategic 
affairs differently. For them, strategic culture is a context that “gives meaning to 
strategic behaviour.”5
3 Max Weber, “Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy,” in Edward Shils and Henry 
Finch, eds. and trans., The Methodology of Social Sciences (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949), pp. 
49-112.
4 American Psychological Association, “The Culture Cognition Connection,” Monitor on 
Psychology, pp. 37-2 (2006).
5 Colin Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context,” Review of International Studies, 25 (1999), 
pp.49-69, p. 51.
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                    Figure 1: Strategic Culture: First Generation
                    Source: Author
This generation, however, remains undertheorized and overly deterministic.6 
Criticizing their tautological explanations, the third generation scholars, such 
as Ian Johnston, conclude that their basic argument is basically that “everything 
matters and everything is connected to everything else.”7 For example, the PRC 
is often described as a country with a victim mentality, which influences Beijing’s 
foreign policies.8 It is often unclear, however, to what extent this history-conscious 
mentality can speak of China’s future. Unsatisfied with the first generation, the 
third generation focused on the development of falsifiable theories. 
The third generation is not without their problems. Questioning Johnson’s 
treatment of strategic culture as a causal factor for strategic behavior, Colin Gray, 
one of the most prominent first generation scholars, argues that strategic behavior 
cannot be separated from strategic culture, for such behavior is essentially 
carried out by encultured people.9 In short, the third generation’s cause-and-
effect approach could be invalid if the independent and dependent variables are 
inseparable.
6 Edward Lock, “Refining Strategic Culture,” Review of International Studies, 36 (2010), pp. 
685-708.
7 Alastair Johnston, “Strategic Cultures Revisited,” Review of International Studies, 25 (1999), 
pp. 519-23.
8 Shuguang Zhang, “China: Traditional and Revolutionary Heritage,” in Ken Booth and 
Russell Trood, eds., Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region (London: Macmillan Press, 
1999), p. 35.
9 Gray (1999), op. cit., p. 135.
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                        Figure 2: Strategic Culture: Third Generation
                        Source: Author
Borrowing ideas from Constructivism, the second generation set out to bridge 
the gaps between the first and third generations. Before discussing the second 
generation, a brief literature review of Constructivism may be necessary. 
(2) Constructivism and the Second Generation of Strategic Culture
Constructivists contend that ideational factors including culture are constitutive 
rather than causal. Instead of directly causing state actions, culture sets the basic 
boundaries for socially viable behavior.10
                               Figure 3: Constructivism
                               Source: Author
One of the problems in Constructivism, however, is that it pays little attention 
to culture’s role at the unit national level of identity formation. As Colin avers, 
strategic choices are made “by people and organisations equipped with dominant 
national (or sub-national) strategic cultural lenses.”11 Yet, by assuming a uniform 
interpretation of interactions that leads into social construction of identities, 
10 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” International Organization, 46-2 
(1992), pp.391-425, p. 401.
11 Gray (1999), op. cit., p. 66.
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Constructivists lost the cultural in their analysis of the social.
The development of Constructivism enlightened the second-generation 
Strategic Culture theorists. They argue that, while influencing strategic practices, 
strategic culture is also “repeatedly reconstituted through the very practices that it 
enables and constrains.”12 
                  Figure 4: Strategic Culture: Second Generation
         Source: Author
However, the Constructivist focus on social interaction became infinitely 
blurry in the second generation's proposition of mutual constitution of culture 
and identity. A security community’s strategic practice is essentially self-centered 
in that it does not take other states into consideration. While in Constructivism 
‘self/other’ identity is socially constructed through interactions among actors, 
the second generation seems to focus on an actor’s actions but not on interaction 
among actors. Mutual construction occurs between strategic practices by the “self” 
and strategic culture of the “self.” The cultural and the social still drift apart.
Lastly and perhaps most importantly, despite the conceptual and analytical 
differences among the three generations of Strategic Culture and Constructivism, 
all three implicitly define culture in ideational terms. For the first generation, 
culture is a set of norms and a context that gives meanings to behavior; ideas in 
12 Bradley Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), p. 37. 
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discourse for the second; causal ideas for the third; and social structure consisting 
of shared ideas for constructivists. However, as Johnston correctly points out, 
it is extremely difficult to establish a cause-effect relationship (or any type of 
relationship) between a cultural idea and its possible resulting behavior. To put it 
more bluntly, we simply cannot get inside the heads of decision makers.
2. Analytical Framework: Constructing a Cultural 
    Constructivist Approach
This paper attempts to synthesize and improve the conceptual frameworks of 
Constructivism and Strategic Culture. Social interaction and (strategic) culture 
are both significant in constituting states’ self/other identities and behaviors. But 
the social and the cultural cannot function separately from each other, as all social 
interactions are essentially culturally embedded. China’s perceived identity of its 
significant Other is culturally constructed through their social interactions, which 
are in turn a reflection of the very identity that China constitutes. 
                            Figure 5: Cultural Constructivist Approach
                            Source: Author
Figure 5 is a conceptual diagram of the Cultural Constructivist approach 
proposed in this paper. From State X’s point of view, State Y’s identity is 
constructed through the social interactions of the two. Such social interactions 
must be culturally interpreted to make sense. Suppose for now that State X is 
China and State Y Japan. In trying to understand why Japanese prime ministers 
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visit Yasukuni Shrine, for instance, China would set such behavior within the 
Chinese cultural context. Did Japan behave this way to harm China’s pride, or to 
honor its ancestors? The answer depends on how Japan’s behavior is interpreted in 
the context of Chinese culture.
This section lays the theoretical foundation for Cultural Constructivism, which 
is a synthesis of the cultural and the social, and it begins here with a redefinition 
of culture. This is a crucial process, because the ideational epistemology of culture 
as reviewed literatures proved to be extremely difficult to maneuver to formulate a 
falsifiable theory. 
(1) Redefining Culture
The number of definitions for culture is numerous, but they could be divided into 
two categories—one focused on the ideational aspect of culture, the other on the 
behavioral. Defining it in ideational terms, Weber contends that culture shapes 
our understanding, perception and conception of the world.13 Similarly, Hofstede 
defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one category of people from another.”14
At the behavioral end, Sapir argues, “culture should be defined as a series of 
human activities in a configuration.”15 Culture consists of behavior shared by 
members of a group and acquired as a result of membership in the group. People 
behave in remarkably dissimilar ways from one place to another, and “politics 
everywhere reflects the culture of a time and place.”16
Comparing the two sets of definition, I argue that the behavioral one is more 
suitable for the analysis of state identity and interactions. Focusing on this aspect 
of culture makes the analysis more observable and therefore more falsifiable. 
Unlike cultural ideas, cultural behavior patterns do not exist in our heads but 
actually, physically and observably manifest. Taking this perspective is also 
intuitive, for interstate relations are essentially the accumulation of state behaviors. 
Thus, in analyzing China’s identity construction and social interactions with its 
significant Other, we have to first identify the Chinese cultural behavior pattern. 
How do the Chinese build relationships with others? What cultural behavior 
patterns are there, and what meanings are construed from state interactions? 
13 Weber (1949), op. cit., p. 37.
14 Geert Hofstede, “Diplomats as Cultural Bridge-builders,” in Hannah Slavik, ed., 
Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy (Malta: Diplofoudation, 2004), pp.25-38, p. 26.
15 Edward Sapir, The Psychology of Culture, Judith Irvine, ed. (The Hague: Mouton De 
Gruyter, 1993) p. 119
16 Oliver Woshinsky, Culture and Politics (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 1-3.
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3. Guanxi as a Cultural Context for Chinese 
Perception and Behavior Rationale
(1) Definitions of Guanxi
The Chinese build culturally unique relationships widely known as guanxi. 
Scholarly accounts of guanxi can be traced back to Weber, who saw it as an im-
portant element in the unique Chinese normative social order.17 Although well 
researched, guanxi continues to be loosely defined and is generally understood 
as a relational context in which individuals interact with each other. Different 
perspectives may define guanxi differently. Lu summarizes that guanxi is a 
type of social capital and relational asset for sociologists; an adaptation to new 
environment and culture for behavioral scientists; and informal institutions for 
institutional economists.18 In any case, guanxi remains robust in all types of social 
practices and discourse of contemporary Chinese society.19
Next is a detailed analysis of guanxi, focusing on its two mutually 
complementary features—‘subjective moral standard’ and ‘long-term reciprocity.’
(2) Subjective Moral Standard
First and foremost, guanxi is a particularistic relationship between two persons. In 
contrast to the West, where an individual’s existence is based on the self through 
introspective processes, the Chinese only exist in their dyad social context 
within reciprocal relationships with others.20 Duties and rights are relational and 
reciprocal rather than universal. In other words, one’s actions can only be correct 
in a social context of interactions with another in a dyadic relationship. In this 
sense, all social matters become moral matters. If one side’s behavior does not 
live up to the other’s, moral accusation occurs. Perception of someone’s identity 
is virtually a function of a subjectively formed historical experience with that 
person.
 
(3) Long-term Reciprocity
Guanxi is a long-term relationship, formed and sustained through balanced 
reciprocity.21 Favors done for others are often social investments with strong 
17 Max Weber, The Religion of China (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 236.
18 Jiantao Lu, “A Social-network Behavioural Approach to Overseas Chinese and Overseas 
Non-Chinese Investments in China,” Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografle, 
103-4 (2012), pp.426-42, pp. 434-437.
19 Mayfair Yang, “The Resilience of Guanxi and Its New Developments,” The China 
Quarterly, 170 (2002), pp.459-76.
20 Lung-kee Sun, Zhongguo wenhua de shenceng jiegou (Guilin: Guangxi Normal University 
Press, 2012), p. 12.
21 Wilfried Bolewski and Candy Rietig, “The Cultural Impact on China’s New Diplomacy,” 
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expectations for handsome returns. The norm of reciprocity is guided by an 
“informal and unwritten code of trust, forbearance, reciprocity and equity.” 
Failure to return favors is blame-worthy, leading to serious damage of one’s social 
standing. Such guanxi must be long-term oriented, as both parties see future values 
in putting resources to maintain guanxi for long-term benefits, even sometimes at 
the expense of short-term sacrifices. The rules of equity and reciprocity might also 
apply to the industrial West, but the emphasis is essentially placed upon isolated 
individuals “socialized to make rational decisions on the basis of self-interest in 
most exchange situations.”22
(4) Behavior Patterns
These two characteristics of guanxi maintain significant implications for Chinese 
cultural behavior patterns. The Chinese endeavor to maintain moral correctness 
is manifested in daily socialization such as drinking, eating and gifting. To avoid 
accidental failures to reciprocate, it is not uncommon for Chinese people to keep 
detailed lists of favor exchanges.23 Thus, subjective moral standard presupposes 
reciprocation. The pursuit of moral correctness is at the core of Chinese social life.
On the other hand, the emphasis on long-term reciprocity implies that equity 
in a single round of negotiation is not as important. Fairness and moral obligations 
are to be fulfilled along the evolvement of guanxi. In a long-term oriented guanxi, 
the Chinese tend to have a more holistic perspective and place individual events 
and issues in historical contexts. Particularly at the beginning of guanxi, Chinese 
are said to be flexible and hospitable in order to gain moral superiority, which 
might be utilized in the next round of negotiation.24
Such guanxi is inherently unstable, for its subjective nature defies objective 
cost and benefit analysis. Since even the seemingly irrelevant actions could be 
relevant for a healthy guanxi, it is unavoidable that players lose track of who owes 
whom. When the indebted continuously fails to live up to the other’s expectation 
for moral conducts, be it out of intention or ignorance, guanxi will eventually 
collapse with moral accusations ensuing from the unsatisfied side.
(5) Hypothesis and Analytical Methodology
Guanxi is a cultural framework within which Chinese perception and behavior 
are constructed. This paper aims to adapt it to the construction of an analytical 
framework to observe China’s perception of and relationship with its significant 
The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 9-2 (2008), pp.83-96, p. 86.
22 David Messick and Karen Cook, Equity Theory (New York: Praeger, 1983).
23 Yunxiang Yan, “The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village,” The China Journal, 35 
(1996), pp.1-25.
24 Bolewski and Rietig, op. cit., p. 87.
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Other Japan. 
I hypothesize that in a guanxi of amity, the Chinese would go out of their way 
to show generosity and friendship while downplaying conflicts. Here, a strong 
positive inertia would prevail and prevent conflicts from rising to the surface. 
While this positive inertia might sustain guanxi, it may also disguise conflicts 
and complicate policy adjustments that are necessary for a sound relationship. 
Unaware of China’s genuine perception, Japan might continue its behavior as the 
countries’ damaged relationship fails to be expeditiously repaired. 
Conversely, once the perception turns to a one of enmity, amity may suddenly 
and bitterly  with tremendous negative inertia that sustains hostility. This may 
hinder China from a purely cost- and benefit-oriented calculation and policy-
making for an extended period of time. 
  Figure 6: Behavior Pattern in Guanxi
  Source: Author
There might be questions regarding the validity of using guanxi, a social 
concept usually ascribed to individuals, to analyze state political phenomena. 
However, state is essentially inseparable from its society, in the sense that the 
former is constituted by norms and rules of the latter. If state and society are 
linked presupposes each other, then it makes sense to consider social concepts in 
order to know the state, and vice versa. The following section describes China’s 
identity formation of Japan. 
4. Sino-Japanese Guanxi
China’s Japan policy has received much attention from scholars and professional 
diplomats alike, with the predominant portion of the literature elaborating on 
political, economic and historical variables. Emphasizing the role of power and 
international structure in China’s foreign policy, Realists might argue that it was 
strategically necessary that the PRC normalize with Japan at the beginning of the 
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1970s in order to improve its national security vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union.25 
However, as will be shown in detail later in this section, with a closer look at 
the bargaining positions of the two in 1972, we will find that Realism cannot 
rationalize China’s series of concessions, including its decision to waive its claim 
for war reparations. 
In addition, Realism simply cannot tell us why China has remained so “cold” 
and hostile toward Japan since the 1980s, as many Sino-Japanese relation experts 
and the general public would characterize. Today, the U.S. has by far the strongest 
military power in the western Pacific and, as Christensen points out, Realists may 
expect China to welcome Japan’s rise as a regional power as a counterweight to 
American hegemony. However, Chinese analysts do not share the general view 
held by many Japan experts throughout the West that Japan is unlikely to pursue 
its military power in earnest in the 21st century.26 The fact that China fears a 
powerful Japan means that the international balance of power alone is insufficient 
for telling which nation poses a greater threat to China. National perceptions and 
historical legacies do matter. China’s visceral distrust of Japan exacerbates the 
security dilemma in their relations.27
Neither can Liberal Institutionalists help us understand China’s behavior 
toward Japan. China’s trade with Japan surpasses its trade with any other countries 
in the region by far, except for the U.S. Japan is also the most generous ODA 
donor for China, providing a total of￥3,133 billion in loans, ￥145.7 billion in 
grant aid and ￥144.6 billion in technical cooperation between 1979 and 2005.28 
But as exchange of goods, money and people boomed between the two,  mutual 
perception deteriorated instead of making improvements. China did not hesitate 
to harshly criticize Japan over history related issuvementses during this period. 
Economist studies show that, today, these two East Asian giants have much to 
gain from their economic interdependence.29 The two countries have too much to 
lose by blaming each other for historical issues, and their behavior rationale must 
lie somewhere else than economic interests.
The Constructivist argument that Japan’s identity as China’s potential enemy 
took shape as a result of social interaction between the two ignores the fact that 
25 For example: Minoru Okada, Nitchu Kankei to ODA [Sino-Japan Relations and ODA] 
(Tokyo: Nihon Kyoho Sha, 2008).
26 Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996).
27 Thomas Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East 
Asia,” International Security, 23-4 (1999), pp. 49-80.
28 Reinhard Drifte, “The End of Japan’s ODA Yen Loan Programme,” Japan Aktuell, 16-1 
(2008), pp.3-15, p. 3.
29 Claes G. Alvstam, Patrick Ström and Naoyuki Yoshino, “On the Economic Interdependence 
between China and Japan,” Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 50-2 (2009), pp.198-214, p. 198.
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the same set of social interaction could be interpreted differently in different 
cultures. A long period of military conflict from the end of the nineteenth century 
is often used as a referent point for the emergence and subsequent persistence of 
China’s Japan image. One of the recent Constructivist approaches was developed 
by Gries, who traced how China’s perception of Japan’s identity is historically 
formed.30 But this claim conveniently ignores the honeymooning decade of Sino-
Japanese relations in the 1970s. Unlike what Constructivists argued, China’s 
image of Japan has not remained static but has undergone a series of changes since 
the early 1970s, as this section will show. While it is important to capture China’s 
perceptual persistence, it is more meaningful to understand the mechanism of how 
perception is formed, sustained and changed; that perception cannot be understood 
without knowing China’s cultural behavior patterns.
The research goal of this paper is to describe how China has culturally 
formed and changed Japan’s identity within the guanxi framework. The 1972 
rapprochement began with a fleeting amity between the two capitals. To show 
its moral magnanimity and gain the upper hand in guanxi, Beijing unilaterally 
forwent its claim for war reparations without any tangible short-term benefits 
in return. For a decade, positive inertia sustained the amity of guanxi while 
downplaying outstanding bilateral issues. However, China’s perception of Japan 
changed dramatically from the mid-1980s as Beijing saw Japan being delinquent 
in its moral obligation. Enmity contained tremendous negative inertia that set the 
basic undertone of Beijing’s Japan policy for years to come. The paper concludes 
with answers to four questions: (1) Under what conditions and in what way do 
Chinese cultural behavior patterns appear in the PRC’s Japan policy? (2) How 
does Japan interpret these behaviors, and are there any misunderstandings due to 
cultural differences? (3) How does China interpret Japan’s (re)actions? How is 
Japan’s identity constructed? and (4) How does Japan’s identity influence China’s 
Japan policy?
(1) Toward Moral Superiority in a Guanxi of Amity: 1972-1982
In its new guanxi with Japan, China tried to maintain a superior moral position. 
For instance, a two-thousand-year Sino-Japanese friendship was frequently 
emphasized not only for its own sake, but also to remind Japan of its cultural 
indebtedness to China.31 In order to morally lock Japan’s future behavior, China 
insisted to add the following part to the 1972 Communiqué. That is: “The 
Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that 
30 Peter Gries, China’s New Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
31 Arif Dirlik, “Past Experience, If Not Forgotten, is a Guide to the Future,” in Miyoshi Masao 
and H.D. Harootunian, eds., Japan in the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 71.
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Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches 
itself.”32 Deep reproach is within the range of moral reflection rather than that of 
law.33 It is significant to note that China was not very meticulous about its legal 
rights (such as demands for war reparations), but was very much so regarding 
its moral position. It is rare to have a moral issue written in a state-to-state legal 
agreement and China’s insistence to do so reflects its cultural behavior pattern. 
A misunderstanding already existed from the beginning. The Chinese side 
was most concerned with the history issue, which was a fundamental moral 
principle underlying China’s new guanxi with Japan. Japan had to forever accept 
China’s version of the past and regret what it did to China. While the Chinese 
never meant to forgive and forget Japanese brutality, the Japanese took the face 
value of the Chinese appeal of “forsak[ing] lesser differences in order to achieve 
big agreement.” Not many Japanese China experts worried at the time that such a 
misunderstanding would create problems in the future.
The war reparations issue vividly reflects China’s cultural behavior pattern in 
guanxi. The PRC announced that it had no intention to claim for war reparation 
from the Japanese in 1955, long before the Soviet threat overshaws its strategic 
calculations.34 To begin with, the issue had once been settled between Japan and 
Taiwan in the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, in which Taipei was forced to 
voluntarily abandon its claim for reparations due to the extremely disadvantaged 
international environment it faced as the Cold War started to unfold.35 But the 
PRC’s negotiation position vis-à-vis Japan in 1972 was much better than that of 
Taiwan in 1952, therefore leaves us to wonder why Beijing had to abandon its 
right before the negotiation even started. 
For Tokyo, a quick normalization with Beijing was rational from the per-
spectives of both the international environment it faced immediately after the 
Nixon Shock and domestic politics that strongly favored Japan to normalize as 
soon as possible.36 Because Tokyo had been constrained by the Cold War structure 
since the early 1950s, it was unable to make any unilateral moves with Beijing 
despite its sentiments toward the mainland. The U.S. secret diplomacy with the 
32 MOFA, Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China (September 29, 1972), at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/
joint72.html (searched date: November 2010)
33 Yoshimi Takeuchi, Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshu vol.11 (Collected Works of Takeuchi Yoshimi 
vol.11) (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1981), p. 394.
34 Ji’nian Zhou Enlai Chuban Faxing Weiyuanhui [Publishing committee in memory of Zhou 
Enlai], Ribenren xinmuzhong de Zhou Enlai [Zhou Enlai in the eyes of the Japanese] (Beijing: 
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chuban, 1991), p.44.
35 Yanjun Yin, Chunichi sensō baishō mondai (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1996), pp. 255-305
36 Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 
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PRC cast tremendous repercussions for the Japanese when it came to light in 
July 1971. In fear of being left behind, even the usually anti-Beijing Premier Sato 
failingly hurried to approach the PRC. It was urgent that Japan normalize with 
China in order to avoid being caught in the narrow valley (tanima) of the U.S.-
Soviet-China triangle.37
In addition, Tokyo’s China policy also received Washington’s endorsement. 
The Japanese leaders assured Washington that the Sino-Japanese rapprochement 
would by no means interfere with the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and the 
disruption of diplomatic ties with Taiwan would not change the island’s status 
in the U.S.-Japan security arrangement. The Honolulu summit meeting between 
Tanaka and Nixon was to confirm Japan’s continuing commitment to these 
strategic actions.38 
Rapprochement with China also made political sense domestically. The issue 
became a focal point in the upcoming Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader 
election. It is true that around the time of the Sino-Japanese rapprochement the 
political power between pro-Taipei and pro-Beijing LDP members was almost 
evenly split.39 Yet, the power balance of the two rivaling groups within general 
LDP members did not matter for normalization. Rather, as the China issue was 
highly controversial, relevant decision-making was concentrated among LDP 
elites. As the LDP party head election revealed, top decision makers with notable 
political sway were overwhelmingly in favor of normalization. Among the four 
party head candidates (Tanaka, Miki, Ohira and Fukuda), only Fukuda was pro-
Taipei. Candidate Tanaka successfully won the election by politicizing the China 
issue. Promising normalization, he was able to defeat Fukuda by gaining support 
from the other two pro-Beijing candidates (Miki and Ohira).40
For the Tanaka Cabinet and related Foreign Ministry top officials, nor-
malization with Beijing ahead of the U.S. was a matter of their own political 
advancement. As Tanaka recalls, for many Japanese political leaders, the China 
issue was more of a domestic than an international matter, and two thirds of 
domestic problems would be solved if Sino-Japanese relationship get settled.41 
Tanaka was allegedly willing to pay reparations if the amount was right. Wan’s 
37 Hiroshi Shinohara, “Beichū sekkin to nihon no bōei,” [Sino-U.S. rapprochement and Japan’s 
defense] Chūō Koron [Central review] (October 1971), p. 149.
38 Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan’s Relations with China,” in Vogel et al, eds., The Golden Age 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 214.
39 Dahui Huang, Riben duihua zhengce yu guonei zhengzhi [Japan’s China policy and its do-
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interview with Japanese diplomats who were involved in decision making during 
this period confirms that Tanaka was ready to pay $10 billion.42 Thus, whether 
China gives up on reparations or not, “with the establishment of the Tanaka 
Administration, diplomatic normalization was already a foregone conclusion.”43 
On the other hand, having brought Nixon to Beijing, China already suc-
cessfully achieved the goal of forming a de facto strategic alliance with 
Washington vis-à-vis Moscow. While the alignment with Washington served 
Beijing’s improved national security, as a junior partner of Washington, 
Tokyo simply did not have the political independence and military might to 
fundamentally tip the balance of the strategic Washington-Moscow-Beijing 
triangle. Simply put, at the dawn of Sino-American rapprochement, Beijing was 
in less of a hurry than Tokyo was to normalize. In addition, Chinese leaders were 
certainly not oblivious to Tokyo’s resentment over America’s secret diplomacy 
and the great momentum within the Japanese government for normalization. 
Still, China heeded to Japanese concerns over the U.S.-Japan Security 
Treaty, the Sato-Nixon Joint Statement and its earlier Peace Treaty with Taiwan 
by promising not to make them outstanding issues in the negotiation, and 
not to formally declare the end of war so that the new treaty between the two 
governments would remain compatible with the 1952 Peace Treaty with Taiwan. 
On top of these concessions, the Chinese side also compromised its demand for 
reparations before the negotiation even started. Public sentiment in China was 
certainly very much against making concessions to the Japanese, but it was not 
strong enough to stand in the way of Mao’s absolute power and charisma. Thus, 
a brief overview and comparison of the negotiation positions of Japan and China 
reveals that China probably did not have to waive its right for reparations while 
conceding so much in other areas. Rather, it was a reflection of a Chinese cultural 
behavior pattern to morally dominate the guanxi. 
The positive inertia of guanxi dominated this period when Beijing made 
efforts to build a solid relationship while downplaying differences. In spite of 
showing explicit displeasure over Tanaka’s meiwaku speech, Zhou quickly agreed 
with Ohira that the two countries should end the past history and develop a 
good relationship.44 Neither did the Diaoyu/Senkaku island issue jeopardize the 
rapprochement. From early 1974 to mid-1975, the two sides signed four bilateral 
trade agreements, which provided the foundation for further economic relations. 
The Japanese side was also cooperative. After China’s unilateral cancellation 
of plant contracts with Japan in 1981, Japanese business leaders, out of their 
42 Wan, op. cit., p. 379.
43 Soeya (2002), op. cit., p. 213.
44 Yomiuri Shimbun (June 23, 2001).
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awareness of China’s generosity over the reparation issue, exerted much energy 
to persuade Tokyo to provide ODA.45 High-level talks continued and social 
exchanges flourished after the passing of Mao and Zhou toward the beginning of 
the 1980s.46 
In sum, Sino-Japanese guanxi in the 1972-82 decade could be characterized as 
one of amity. Chinese leaders exerted much effort to reconstruct its Japan identity 
as a benign neighbor to justify its new diplomatic initiative. China tried to show 
its generosity in order to gain moral superiority in a new guanxi with Japan. 
Since China took guanxi as a one of amity during this period conflicts such 
as territorial dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku  were put behind as if they did not 
even exist. This positive inertia would not be sustainable if the moral principle of 
reciprocity was perceived neglected.
(2) Perception Shift: 1982-1989
China’s perception of Japan started to change from around 1982 when a series 
of bilateral issues such as the textbook dispute began to rise to the surface. 
The Chinese side often linked Japan’s China policy with China’s previous 
generosity, and accused it of its moral wrongdoings. One such example would 
be the complaint that although China had generously given up its demand for 
war reparations, the Japanese Ministry of Education still approved the textbooks 
refering to invasion of China as entering and leaving.47
In 1982, the Chinese made a large deal over the textbook issue, criticizing Japan 
for the first time since normalization. An intensive diplomatic and media campaign 
against Japan’s textbook revision lasted for six weeks until Tokyo conceded to 
making corrections.48 This controversy served to reveal China’s perceived identity 
of Japan. Without specifically mentioning Japan, Deng Xiaoping indirectly but 
firmly addressed the issue at the Twelfth Party Congress in September, arguing 
that China has no tolerance for foreign encroachment on its independence and 
sovereignty.49 The textbook dispute cannot be entirely orchestriated by the Beijing 
government, as anti-Japanese public meetings and photographic exhibitions 
mushroomed at different localities of the mainland.50 Thus, the textbook debate 
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46 Akihiko Tanaka, Nicchū kankei 1945 – 1990 (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1991), pp. 53-
54.
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48 Allen Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 46-
51.
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Press, 1984), p. 396.
50 Caroline Rose, Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations (New York: Routledge, 
1998), p. 137.
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illustrated that a negative perception of Japan prevailed within both Chinese 
government and Chinese society. As a result of China’s hardened stance, the then 
Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki was humiliated during his visit to China when the 
Chinese side lectured him on Japan’s past aggression and need for compunction.51
Scholarly accounts of the dispute vary. Some conclude that China reacted to 
the issue spontaneously, as it posed a serious threat to Sino-Japanese relations.52 
Rewriting the history of war was a significant concern that Beijing could not 
overlook. Others argue that the issue was a manifestation of Chinese domestic 
politics and/or the international environment.53 Whatever strategic rationale lay 
behind Beijing’s decisions to launch the massive media campaign, the Chinese 
government’s policy seems to have resonated with its people’s interpretation of 
Japan. China’s cultural interpretation of Japan’s conduct set the parameter for its 
Japan policy.
Ironically, bilateral disputes increased as the amount of ODA increased during 
the Nakasone Administration. In 1985, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone 
made an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine honoring war dead, 
including class-A war criminals from the Second World War. Protest from China 
was vehement, and nationalistic students throughout the mainland demonstrated 
against the visit. On the day of Nakasone’s visit, China’s official newspaper 
People’s Daily featured stories of anti-Japanese war heroes along with a protest 
statement by spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.54 Japan’s role as a 
menace to China’s sovereignty loomed large behind the stories, and nationwide 
anti-Japanese sentiment fermented. 
The Chinese government dealt with the issue calmly, though China’s perception 
of Japan had already started to show changes. In People’s Daily, for instance, 
articles opposing the shrine visit lasted only few days. Except for a short comment 
by the foreign ministry spokesperson on the 15th, the government did not publish 
any provocative protests. Rather, Japanese opposition parties’ objection to the visit 
was documented, as in addition to references to brutal crimes committed by the 
Japanese during the Nanjing Massacre and Unit-731 biological warfare. Writers 
of these news articles seemed very cautious in wordings so that harsh expressions 
were directed exclusively against Japanese militarists. Heeding to the bilateral 
relations with Japan, mixed messages were sent out as was in the 16th article, 
which documented a friendly meeting between the Japanese prime minister and 
51 Chalmers Johnson, “The Pattern of Japanese Relations with China,” Pacific Affairs, 59-3 
(1986), pp.402-28, pp. 419-25.
52 Furukawa, op. cit.
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China’s ambassador.55 Judging from China’s mixture of criticism and appeasement 
of Japan, it can be inferred that facing a significant Other who behaves beyond the 
framework of cultural behavior pattern of itself, China’s perception of Japan was 
in a stage of confusion that denotes neither amity nor enmity.
In the following years, bilateral issues emerged incessantly. The textbook 
dispute resurfaced and the Japanese government once again succumbed to 
Beijing’s pressure, promising that the disputed portion be reexamined and a 
revised textbook guideline newly issued. Also, Beijing strongly protested when the 
Japanese court ruled the ownership of Kokaryo, a student dormitory in Kyoto, to 
Taipei instead of Beijing. Tokyo explained that its government was in no position 
to intervene in a court ruling based on the system of separation of power. The issue 
was intricately related to history and China’s sovereignty, as it involved Taiwan 
which had once been appropriated and made a colony of Japan. Deng Xiaoping 
bluntly pointed out that Kokaryo was a moral issue. Linking the dispute to China’s 
earlier generosity, he argued that Japan should recognize its deep indebtedness to 
China, a country that could have but did not demand war reparations at the time 
of normalization.56 These events in the mid-1980s significantly changed China’s 
perception of Japan, and a more worried Beijing criticized Japan’s increase in 
defense spending to only slightly above one percent of its GNP.
Meanwhile, Chinese propaganda further vitiated Japan’s image among the 
general public and cast profound implications for its long-term Japan policy. 
Harsh verbal expressions and shocking imagery used to describe Japan’s atrocities 
against Chinese citizens during the war flooded the media.57 China’s Japan experts 
were also often dissatisfied with Japan’s attitude of seeing itself as a victim instead 
of a victimizer in the war. After Nakasone’s Yasukuni visit, an article in People’s 
Daily by a Japan expert noted that there is little self-criticism against Japanese 
militarism and imperialism.58 Meanwhile, mass anti-Japanese demonstrations 
increased after 1985.
China’s concern over Japan’s defense capability was also a function of its 
perceived identity of the neighbor. In his meeting with Japanese Prime Minister 
Suzuki Zenko in September 1982, Zhao Ziyang no longer mentioned bilateral 
cooperation against hegemonism.59 Further, Nakasone’s suggestion in November 
1983 to exchange information on Soviet deployment in the Far East received 
55 People’s Daily (August 16,17, 1985).
56 Masashi Ando and Kazuki Kotake, eds., Genten Chūgoku Gendai-shi, Volume 8: Nicchū 
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post-War Sino-Japan relations] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1997), p. 384.
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no reply from Hu Yaobang.60 Beijing also reversed its initial support for Japan’s 
military buildup. In February 1983, China Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian told the 
Japanese side that Japan’s armed forces should be limited to defense.61 Regardless 
of Japan’s reserved defense orientation,62 the Chinese media exercised strong 
caution against the Nakasone cabinet’s decision to break the ceiling of one percent 
of GNP for annual defense spending in 1987.63
As Japan’s identity deteriorated, economic frictions were also politicized. 
Beijing was becoming increasingly irritated by the soaring trade deficit with 
Japan. In July 1985, Gu Mu complained to the Japanese side that the huge deficit 
would obstruct development of the two countries.64 Although the deficit was a 
complicated phenomenon not necessarily caused by the Japanese side alone, both 
Chinese elites and the general public seem to have expected Japan to generously 
support China’s economic development. Dissatisfied with the bilateral economic 
relations, Deng Xiaoping mentioned in June 1987 that Japan should remember its 
indebtedness to China for not requesting reparations, and offer to help for China’s 
development.65 Deng’s statements resonated with Chinese citizens who went out 
on the streets shouting against “Japanese Economic Invasion.”66 Whenever a 
problem arose in Sino-Japanese relations, there was always strong social pressure 
on Chinese leaders to make Japan concede. 
Here, a collectively shared opinion of Japan had already begun to significantly 
constrain Chinese leaders’ Japan policy. He Yinan points out that even the then 
supreme leader Deng Xiaoping was significantly constrained by domestic social 
and political pressure to take a strong stance against Japan.67 Hu Yaobang also 
suffered a political setback after Nakasone’s 1985 Yasukuni visit, as he was 
attacked by conservatives for being too close with Nakasone.68 
Thus, China’s perception of Japan had started to change dramatically since 
1982. The new guanxi of friendship with Japan was premised on that Japan 
repents its past aggression and behave accordingly, as China insisted in the 1972 
60 Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “China’s Japan Policy in the 1980s,” International Affairs, 61-1 
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Communiqué. Therefore, Tokyo’s policies toward the textbook, Yasukuni and 
Kokaryo issues appeared to the Chinese that Japan was not seriously repenting its 
past actions. In the eyes of China, Japan failed to fulfill the moral obligation of 
guanxi, and the entire foundation of reciprocity and amity started to crumble.
(3) Guanxi of Enmity: 1989-1998
After a period of reinterpretation of Japan’s identity through the bilateral 
interactions durin the 1982-89 Sino-Japanese guanxi, China came out disappointed 
by Japan’s negligence of its moral obligation. As a result, the memory of Japan’s 
invasion was recalled and negative perception of the neighbor was consolidated 
in the 1990s. Which part of the past a society chooses to retain as its collective 
memory depends on its contemporary ideas and preoccupations.69 Rather than 
celebrating a two-thousand-year friendship between these two similar cultures, 
China chose to recall the traumatic war experience with Japan to symbolize the 
country’s deepest threats and fears.
Although Japan’s identity as an enemy was reconstructed under the strong 
initiative of the CCP in order to divert domestic discontents overseas, it was 
an identity that fit the social context of China-Japan interaction in the previous 
decade and so could be accepted by the general public. War experience with 
Japan may also be deeply planted in Chinese people’s memory. However, without 
the Sino-Japanese quanxi in the preceding 1980s, when the perception of Japan 
that lacks moral correctness was formed China would not here brought up war 
memories and critisized Japan so harshly and persistently.
As Chinese state and society continued to articulate this image of Japan, Japan’s 
role, arbitrary in the previous decade, was consolidated as an enemy of China in 
the 1990s. Japan was repeatedly used as a symbol of China’s past humiliation, and 
national narratives as such became routinized and shared down generations and 
among state society members. With a strong focus on remembrance of the anti-
Japanese war, Japan’s contemptible identity was shared through songs, films and 
books, in addition to school education and museums.70 In short, China’s perception 
of Japan was institutionalized.
Although the post-Tiananmen years first boded well for Sino-Japanese relations, 
instead of a genuine amity, Beijing turned to Japan only for instrumental purposes 
to maneuver through international isolation and access Western countries. Chinese 
government clearly discouraged any writing against Japan. Regardless of Tokyo’s 
effort to provide military assistance for U.S. operations in the Gulf War and its 
69 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 224.
70 Zheng Wang, “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical 
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five-year defense program buildup that started in 1990, the Chinese government 
refrained from repeating its previous criticism against the Japanese revival 
of militarism.71 The fact that Beijing first turned to Tokyo but not to Western 
countries reveals its tacit but firm belief that Japan, due to its moral indebtedness 
to China in their guanxi, must feel obligated to help China get back on its feet in a 
time of predicament.
Tokyo responded positively to Beijing’s appeasement. When international 
pressure to place economic sanctions against China was accumulating, the 
Japanese Prime Minister Uno argued that Japan could not follow the harsh 
policies of Western countries, for Sino-Japanese relations simply “differ from 
those of the United States.” Japan thus played a special role in the 1989-1992 
period in bringing the PRC back into the international community. It was against 
this backdrop that Jiang Zemin visited Japan and the Japanese emperor, who in 
1992 reciprocated a visit to Beijing for the first time in history. Not only were the 
Japanese sanctions the most restrained among industrial countries in the Group of 
Seven, but Tokyo was also the very first to resume full cooperation with China in 
as early as 1991.
However, the perception of an evil Japan unheedful of its past aggression 
had not changed, even though Beijing knew there was much to gain through 
cooperation with Tokyo. Both countries wished to denuclearize the Korean 
Peninsula, desired for sea-lane safety in the Pacific Rim, and shared common 
goals in energy security, environmental protection, counter-terrorism, transnational 
crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Yet, once the instrumental 
value of appeasing Japan disappeared and the negative impacts of Tiananmen 
started to wane, Beijing resumed its criticism. In the guanxi of enmity, Japan has 
been perceived as a potential menace that could compromise China’s national 
interests.  “[W]hether or not states really are existential threats to each other is in 
one sense not relevant, since once a logic of enmity gets started states will behave 
in ways that make them existential threats.”72 
In vivid contrast to the 1970s when Beijing cultivated and nurtured friendship 
with Tokyo, in the 1990s China frequently criticized Japan for its lack of 
moral compunction over past wrongdoings. The undertone of these criticisms 
emphasized the “need to admit your mistakes and get back on the right path 
toward a healthy relationship.” Bilateral problems once avoided were now 
emerging. Beijing became more vigilant toward Tokyo’s position over Taiwan, 
pushing for Japan to adopt a Three-No policy—clearly not included in the 1972 
71 Robert Ross, “U.S. Relations with China,” in Vogel et al., eds. (2002), op. cit.
72 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory and International Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p. 236.
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Communiqué.73 Beijing also explicitly expressed its ingratitude for Tokyo’s 
official development aid. When the Japanese government decided to suspend ODA 
in August 1995 to put pressure on Beijing’s nuclear tests, the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry issued a lengthy statement, arguing that Japan “should engage in deep 
introspection of previous war crimes.” Li Peng points out that Japan’s ODA could 
never fully compensate for what Japanese militarists had done to the Chinese 
people in the past.74
China’s negative perception of Japan could not be concealed in its actual 
foreign policies. In response to Kim Dae-Jung’s commitment to never mention 
history problems during the Japan-Korean Summit in 1998, the Japanese side 
agreed to express their “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” for the Korean 
people in the Japan-Korean Joint Declaration. In contrast to this smooth and 
considerable improvement of a bilateral relationship, shortly thereafter on a visit 
to Japan, Chinese President Jiang Zemin demanded the same treatment but refused 
to make any promises regarding history issues. The Japanese Premier Obuchi 
did not yield to Chinese pressure and so no such words were added to the Sino-
Japanese Joint Declaration.75 The Declaration also lacked the signatures of the two 
leaders, and Jiang lashed out at Tokyo’s attitude on history in every city he visited 
in Japan. 
Beijing’s perception of Japan based on a guanxi of enmity began to trigger 
backlash from Tokyo. The Tiananmen massacre had already eroded China’s moral 
superiority over Japan, who became less willing to take moral criticism. China’s 
excessive use of the history card had estranged even those Japanese who wished 
to improve relations with China. For example, the pro-Beijing former Foreign 
Minister Kono pressured China to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 
1995.76 As mutual perceptions deteriorated, the Sino-Japanese rivalry simmered 
over leadership in Asia and territorial disputes in the East China Sea. In addition to 
China’s nuclear tests in the mid-1990s and Beijing’s large-scale military exercises 
in the Taiwan Strait to blackmail Taiwan at the eve of its presidential elections in 
1996, the growing rivalry over history-related issues put the Japanese on high alert 
over the PRC. Beijing’s persistent moral accusations pulled its guanxi with Japan 
into a downward enmity. 
5. Negative Inertia (1998 ~ ?)
After the 1998 Jiang-Obuchi summit, it became clear to Beijing that its Japan 
73 Wan, op. cit., pp. 127-128.
74 Beijing Review (September 18-24, 1995; October 16-22, 1995).
75 Yomiuri Shimbun (November 27-28, 1998).
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policy had proven counterproductive. Thus, for a short period thereafter China 
attempted to switch to appeasement. The 1999 Jiang-Obuchi summit produced a 
bilateral agreement on China’s WTO accession, and the Chinese leader refrained 
from mentioning history during the talk. In 2000, Jiang met a 5,000-member 
Japanese delegation and emphasized the importance of a good relationship with 
Japan. Without discussing history, Zhu Rongji visited Japan in October 2000, 
helping to improve Japan’s image of China.
Yet, even now Beijing has not been able to completely pull itself out of 
guanxi’s negative inertia, that confines its Japan policy. History still tops as the 
most sensitive issue, ahead of Taiwan, Diaoyu/Senkaku disputes, and U.S.-Japan 
security cooperation.77 Through history issues, China concluded that Japan cannot 
live up to its expectation as a responsible counterpart in their morally reciprocal 
relationship. The former Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Chen Jian, argued that 
“Japan did not thoroughly, profoundly and comprehensively reconsider its 
aggression against China.”78 The former Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan 
commented that “Japan has never completely abandoned its militarist past in the 
same way as Germany has with the Nazis. If it were to do so, China and other 
Asian nations would not have to keep reminding Japan of history so often.”79 
The Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing asked why Japan cannot do what 
Europeans have done over history issues.80
Beijing’s emphasis of the history issue as the political foundation of the 
bilateral relationship seems genuine rather than merely rhetorical. For instance, 
the argument that China uses history as its diplomatic card only in order to have a 
better bargain in political and economic areas vis-à-vis Japan cannot be justified, 
for it cannot explain overseas Chinese criticism against Japan.81 If the history 
issue were indeed a rhetoric that the Chinese employ in order to manipulate, 
it should be raised more often during disputes than at other times and directed 
mainly at the Japanese audience. In reality, however, it has been raised in both 
eventful and tranquil times and targeted mainly at the Chinese audience. He Yinan 
argues that compared with the propagandistic aim of Beijing’s media campaign 
in the 1960s, China now demands Japan’s “sincere contrition and serious reform 
of history educations.” In addition, the scale and spontaneity of anti-Japanese 
77 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Some Sensitive Issues” (May 8, 2002), at http://
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79 Michael Laris, “An Apology Rooted in Fear,” Washington Post (November 25, 1998).
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mass demonstrations are too great for all of them to be administered by Beijing. 
For example, the CCP even takes action to restrain its people from excessive anti-
Japanese movements on occasion.82 It is difficult to imagine that China would 
sacrifice its long-term relationship with Japan by hounding it about history issues 
just for the sake of short-term benefits. As Japan’s sense of guilt fades and the 
effectiveness of China’s history card decreases, it only makes sense to conclude 
that the reason China still holds on to the history issue so tenaciously goes beyond 
diplomatic utility.
The CCP’s patriotic campaign has been successful precisely because it 
resonated with Chinese people’s perception of Japan. Among all the external 
conflicts, the Chinese government and society chose to demonize Japan not only 
because it was the country that rendered the deepest wound to China’s pride, 
but also because it, in China’s eyes, was egregiously attempting to evade war 
responsibility. To the Chinese, if Japan fails to reciprocate their previous favor, 
they would have to reclaim their right for compensations. Thus began the war 
reparations movement by Chinese war victims filing lawsuits in Japanese courts.
China’s memory did not fade with time. Taking the Yasukuni dispute, for 
example, it was counterintuitive to find out that China criticized the Japanese 
prime minister’s visit more harshly in 2001 than in 1985. In July 2001, Chinese 
Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with his Japanese counterpart Makiko 
Tanaka and warned that Koizumi’s visit would cause extremely serious political 
problems for the two countries, because the decision would reflect Japan’s lack 
of commitment to repenting its past. With pungent verbal bombardment, Beijing 
issued a series of statements and strongly urged Koizumi to cancel the visit. 
Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that treatment of the Yasukuni issue had 
always been a touchstone of Japan’s attitude toward its history of aggression. By 
ignoring the 1972 political principle that the Japanese side would stay keenly 
aware of the serious damage it did to the Chinese people, Koizumi’s decision, 
Wang claimed, had once again made Asian people lose confidence in Japan. In 
contrast to the Nakasone visit in 1985, People’s Daily covered related issues much 
more intensively and for a much longer period in 2001.83
In comparison with other neighboring countries, even South Korea with its 
past of annexation as a Japanese territory made an effort to move beyond history 
after 1998. Although the history issue reemerged in South Korea-Japan relations 
in early 2005 when Japan’s Shimane prefecture designated February 22nd as 
“Takeshima Day” for a disputed island (Dokdo in Korean), the situation was 
contained by the Korean government, and Seoul said it would continue mutual 
82 He (2009), op. cit., pp.227-79.
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visits by leaders. South Korea and China are similar in that both want to maintain 
a sound economic relationship with Japan. Also, when China harshly criticized 
Japan over the Yasukuni visit, Southeast Asian nations did not engage in any 
large-scale intense criticism against Japan. Upon visiting ASEAN countries after 
Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit, the LDP leader Taku Yamazaki noticed that ASEAN 
officials focused more on economic cooperation with Japan than on history.84
In contrast, China and Japan have continued mutual hostility.85 A survey in 
1999 showed that over half of Chinese people associated Japan with “aggression,” 
“hatred” and “war.”86 A 2004 poll revealed that the primary reason student 
respondents did not feel close to Japan was that they believed Japan did not 
repent of its past invasion to China.87 In the anti-Japan social climate, it grows 
increasingly more difficult for Beijing’s policy makers to take bold measures 
toward cooperation, lest their own political positions be undermined.
As China continues to see Japan as a potential foe, China’s Japan policy has 
caused significant repercussions from Japan. In marked contrast to its reactive 
approach in the 1982-89 period, the Japanese government is becoming more 
irritated with China’s highhandedness and more explicit about its concerns over 
Chinese nuclear tests, defense spending, missiles, illegal immigration and Chinese 
ships in the disputed sea areas.88 In the social process of interaction, perception of 
the Other becomes “self-fulfilling prophecy.” that perpetuates a perceived identity. 
That is to say, if a country sees another as its enemy, the other will indeed behave 
as one. Seen as an enemy, Japan can only assume that assigned role and confront 
China. As a result, both countries now seem to be trapped in this negative inertia 
from which neither could pull out unilaterally. 
Conclusion
What was the academic value of the Cultural Constructivist approach and the 
guanxi framework in Sino-Japanese relations? Or, to put it differently, what 
did it accomplish that conventional wisdom failed to? Juxtaposing it against 
Realism, to what extent was China’s Japan policy influenced by other powers? 
Beijing’s strategic concern over the two superpowers was certainly not irrelevant. 
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But international distribution of power alone is insufficient for us to understand 
China’s threat perception. 
A shift in power balance per se does not necessarily entail policy reorientation. 
Realists may argue that China hardened its position vis-à-vis Japan as it perceived 
a relative decline of Soviet power after the Reagan Administration issued its 
aggressive security policy. The rationale is that a weaker Soviet Union meant a 
decrease in the utility value of Japan as a counterweight. Although Beijing had 
attempted to garner whatever support was available against Moscow, in reality it 
is unlikely that Tokyo has ever been on par with the two superpowers in Beijing’s 
strategic calculation. If there was any country China should have balanced as 
a result of Soviet decline, it was the U.S. As history proves, however, China’s 
perception of the U.S. was immune to its relative power status. Rather, its people’s 
image of the United States steadily improved during the 1980s in tandem with 
a deteriorating opinion of Japan, declining Soviet threat and toughening U.S. 
foreign policy. 
A similar argument also applies to the United States. A pure balance-of-
power theory would predict that China encourage Japan’s military buildup as a 
counterweight against the U.S. in the unipolar world after the 1990s. As illustrated 
here, however, this situation is obviously something that China wanted to avoid. 
Instead of a function of power balance, China’s Japan policy only reflects the 
perceived identity of its neighbor. If the two nations had truly put their past behind 
them and nurtured friendship, they would have never engaged in a realpolitik 
game or been influenced by major world powers.
The Cultural Constructivist approach captures the process of such identity 
construction. Japan’s identity as China’s significant other has been constructed 
through guanxi in a bilateral relationship that strongly reflects Chinese cultural 
behavior pattern. China’s generosity in foregoing its demand for war reparations 
and avoiding disputes with Japan in the initial phase of amity was not out of pure 
goodwill, but followed a cultural behavior pattern dictated by guanxi in which 
China assumes the morally dominant position. As time passed without Japan 
repenting of its past, China’s perception of its former friend began to sour in the 
1980s and a guanxi of enmity developed that has dominated China’s Japan policy 
since the 1990s. In response to China’s Japan policy, Japan’s perception of China 
likewise deteriorated, and the two now sit bogged down in a bilateral structure 
that benefits neither.
As a summary, the rest of the paper answers the four questions raised at the 
beginning: (1) Under what conditions and in what way do Chinese cultural 
behavior patterns appear in the PRC’s Japan policy? The existence of guanxi 
necessitated two conditions: China’s moral superiority and expectation of long-
term reciprocity. First of all, China forsook its claim for war reparations during 
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the normalization negotiation process in exchange for moral superiority over 
Japan. Granted that China had few material resources economically or politically 
to impress Japan otherwise, the war reparations issue served as an effective 
way to dominate the guanxi. Second, moral superiority automatically entails 
the expectation of reciprocity in the long run. This is where the cultural and the 
material intertwine. Cultural behavior such as generosity exercised to obtain 
moral superiority is essentially materially motivated with the goal of long-
term gains. There are a few points that make Sino-Japanese guanxi cultural. 
For the Chinese, moral superiority was more important than tangible short-
term gains. Indeed, there is no evidence to the author’s knowledge that Beijing 
wanted Tokyo’s economic support at the point of normalization. Especially 
when the two countries normalized their relations, China was still in a precarious 
international environment with military risks and political uncertainties with the 
two superpowers. Though it was not certain that moral superiority vis-à-vis Japan 
would yield specific benefits at the beginning, as a risk management tool, it was 
clear to Chinese leaders that it was a more valuable asset than war reparations. 
This is the long-term benefit that the Chinese secretly expected. 
(2) How did Japan interpret these behaviors? The Japanese side did not seem to 
fully understand China’s intentions. The fact that China’s announcement to forsake 
war reparations came as tremendous shock shows that the Japanese were unaware 
what lies behind such generous offers. Also, Japan never truly understood China’s 
reaction to its history related policies. While the Chinese seriously meant what 
they said, and developed mistrust and antagonism against Japan over its treatment 
of their history, the Japanese tend to regard such criticism as rhetoric for material 
gains. 
(3) How did China interpret Japan’s (re)actions? This misunderstanding due to 
cultural differences significantly hindered effective communication. The Japanese 
never sounded out China’s hidden agenda at the beginning of their normalization. 
Neither have they been able to appreciate the visceral hatred in Chinese people 
over Japan’s treatment of their history. The initial generosity and following 
acrimony of the Chinese are essentially two sides of the same coin of guanxi. With 
Japan failing to live up to China’s moral expectation to comply with the Chinese 
version of the past, and only less likely to do so in the future, its identity in the 
eyes of China has and will continue to deteriorate falling, prey of an increasingly 
avid Chinese nationalism. 
(4) How did Japan’s identity influence China’s Japan policy? This point has 
been focus of much of the paper, and so it should suffice to say that Beijing’s 
Japan policy is a direct reflection of its perceived identity.
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